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There was only a jigsaw puzzle of dry
ground;

Professor Weir contends that "the vegetarian
argument from unnecessary pain fails" because:

A shroud of unfinished power lines
dangling in silence.

(1) "the Empirical Argument from Nutrition
equivocat[es] regarding what is meant by
'vegetarian,' 'adequate for human nutrition,'
and 'unnecessary for nutrition,' "

Shadow cows wandered
over broken fence pieces,
prodding memories of grass.

(2) "animals can be raised humanely and killed
mercifully," and

I asked a hungry man,

(3) "the primajacie obligation not to inflict pain
is overridden by the nutritional risk of
vegetarianism (especially veganism)."

Where is the beautiful land I came to see?
This is her legacy,
he told me sadly.

Weir fails to establish any of these points as compelling
criticisms of a moral obligation to become vegetarians.
We shall discuss each of his arguments in turn.

The legend you seek is dead.
She was once virgin bride to the world.
Her dowry was a sea of zebra.

The Empirical Argument from Nutrition

Her wildebeest thundered
Weir begins his attack on the proposition that "a
vegetarian diet is adequate for human nutrition" by
claiming that attempting to justify it by referring to "the
large numbers of vegetarians who are 'hale and thriving' "
"obviously is an inductive hasty generalization,
[because] the empirical fact that some vegetarians are
healthy does not prove that all human!l-{)r even most
humans-will be healthy on a vegetarian diet."
However, far from being obvious, this charge of
fallacious reasoning is false.

like a summer storm.
She was jungle, mountain, and river.
Long ago her lxxly throbbed
with blood and breath.
She was warm and alive.
We called her Africa.
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An inductive generalization is hasty when the
sample upon which the generalization is based is too
small. Now, recent estimates place the number of
vegetarians in the United States at around 10 million,
with a similar number in the United Kingdom. There
are many more millions of vegetarians around the
world. This is not a small sample. Additionally, these
millions of vegetarians come from both sexes, all
stages of life, and a wide variety of ethnic, cultural,
and sO'cio-economic backgrounds. They are a diverse
as well as a large sample.
But are these people healthy? Books advocating
vegetarianism cite numerous, recent, scientific
studies indicating they are. Common sensically, it is
difficult to believe that tens of millions of people
would voluntarily continue with a diet they found
adversely affected their health. But that is what
vegetarians who have the option of eating meat are
doing and have been doing for many years, even
generations. Indeed, my experience has been that the
majority of American vegetarians are "health
vegetarians" rather than "ethical vegetarians;" that is,
most American vegetarians are vegetarians because
they find that diet to be healthier for them.
Consequently, although no inductive generalization
could "prove," in some conclusive, deductive sense,
that every person would find a vegetarian diet healthy,
the generalization from the number of health
vegetarians to the conclusion that "a vegetarian diet
is adequate for human nutrition" is a reliable one. The
considerable amount of empirical evidence for that
generalization puts a considerable burden of proof on
those, like Weir, who wish to deny the adequacy of a
vegetarian diet. That burden is not met by his
fallacious charge of fallacious reasoning.
Weir's substantive effort to shoulder this burden is
his contention that that proposition is ambiguous about
what "vegetarian" covers and what "adequate" means.
His concern with "vegetarian" is that this term is used
to refer to both those who merely avoid eating meat
and those who eat neither meat nor other animal
products. The importance of this distinction for Weir
lies in the possibility of obtaining nutrients necessary
for human health from eggs and dairy products. So,
the possible ambiguity of "vegetarianism" is really a
secondary matter; it is basically the requirements of an
"adequate" diet that concern him.
Weir claims that "the vegetarian diet is so risky that
no one should impose it on another person." The
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vegetarian diet is risky, he argues, because of the
following "facts:"
"Vitamin B-12 is an essential nutrient and naturally
occurs only in animals products,"
"only 5-10 percent of the iron in vegetables is
absorbed during digestion,"
"infants and preschool children need animal
protein,"
"vegan diets are also especially susceptible to
deficiencies in calcium, riboflavin, Vitamin A,
and Vitamin D," and
different people and people at different periods of
their lives have increased need of these
nutrients.
Incredibly, after presenting this litany ofdangers, Weir
totally undermines his argument about the risks of
vegetarianism by conceding that "supplements can
make virtually any diet 'adequate.'.. So, all these
fearsome "facts" about the risks of a vegetarian diet
can be overcome by popping an occasional vitamin pilL
Would that all the risks of life could be so easily
conquered!
Nonetheless, let us spend a moment on some of
Weir's specific "facts." In the same paragraph where
he says that Vitamin B-12 "naturally occurs only in
animal products," Weir acknowledges that vegans, who
eat no animal products, can get B-12 from "tempeh or
miso (soy) fermented with the Klebsiella bacteria" or
"yeast grown on media rich in B-12," as well as from
vitamin pills and "fortified" foods. Since B-12 can be
readily obtained in a variety of ways, even without
supplements and even by vegans, how does our need
for B-12 put vegetarians of either sort at risk? The
reassuring truth of the matter is that we need only small
quantities of this vitamin, that it can be obtained readily
and inexpensively from plant sources, and that the surest
and easiest way of doing this is via a so-called "dietary
supplement." One such supplement, picked at random,
contains 833% of the recommended daily allowance of
B-12 in one little pill. So, one pill a week, and the
"facts" about B-12 which frighten Weir are irrelevant
As to the iron issue, the relevant fact is not what
percentage of available iron is absorbed but whether
the individual obtains the iron he needs. According to
John Robbins, in Diet for a New America (Walpole,
NH: Stillpoint Publishing, 1987), "long-term studies
show no iron deficiencies arising from lacto-ovo or pure
vegetarian diets" (p. 300). Apparently absorbing 5-10%
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of the iron available in vegetables is all we need. So, ooce
again, where's the risk from vegetManism of either sat?
Again, Weir contends that "susceptible to osteoporosis, all vegan women must carefully monitor their
calcium intake since they consume no dairy products."
However, according to the August 1, 1986, issue of
Science, there is a "large body of evidence indicating
no relationship between calcium intake and bone
density." Apparently, it is low levels of estrogen, not
ofcalcium, that are the source of osteoporosis. Furthermore, according to Neal Barnard, M. D., "studies now
show that high levels of protein-particularly animal
protein-drain calcium from the body" (The Animals'
Agenda, November, 1989, p. 7). He also notes that
broccoli, kale, spinach, almonds, sunflower seeds, and
other green vegetables and fruits are good sources of
calcium, while "milk is probably the poorest choice for
a calcium supplement." Thus, far from showing
vegetarians, including vegans, at risk, the facts about
osteoporosis indicate that it is meat-eaters who are most
at risk to this disease.
Weir does not elaborate on why "infants and
preschool children need animal protein," and that
statement looks more like a conclusion than a statement
of fact At the recent World Vegetarian Day celebration
at Stanford University, Dr. Michael Klaper, a
pediatrician and author of Pregnancy, Children and the
Vegan Diet (Umatilla, FL: Gentle World, 1988),
asserted that "there is nothing found exclusively in
animal products that is essential for children's health
and growth." Apparently, this practicing pediatrician
has not encountered Weir's "facts." Also, Dr. Klaper's
presentation suggested that vegan parents do not need
to pay closer attention to their children's diets than do
meat-eating parents to ensure that their children receive
all needed nutrients.
Weir asserts without citing studies that "vegan
infants and children are usually malnourished,
underweight, and neurologically underdeveloped."
Might this be a hasty generalization? Even if
statistically true, might there be socio-economic and
educational reasons for this sad condition that have
nothing to do with the adequacy of vegetable protein
for children? For example, it's doubtless true that
impoverished "infants and children are malnourished,
underweight. and neurologically underdeveloped," and
it may be that a considerable number of vegans in third
world countries are impoverished. Once again, it is
doubtful that Weir has facts here, and he fails to provide
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an argument showing the relevance of whatever it is he
does have to his claim that vegetarianism is risky.
Thus, Weir's "facts" about nutrition are dubious and
do not entail that a vegetarian diet of either sort is risky.
Nor does his analysis entail what Weir ought (logically)
to be trying to prove but never mentions: that a
vegetarian diet is more risky than a meat-eating diet.
After all, if a meat-eating diet is more risky than a
vegetarian diet, then Weir's argument based on the risks
of vegetarianism is irrelevant in yet another way.
Perhaps Weir does not undertake this comparative
analysis because he afraid of what it would show.
Judging from the massive size of the vitamin industry
and its advertisements, which do not even suggest that
it is only or primarily vegetarians who should be
buying these products, meat-eaters must feel a great
need to supplement their diets. Also, vegetarian diets
reduce many kinds of health risk, such as trichinosis,
salmonella, and mercury poisoning, various kinds of
cancer, osteoporosis, arteriosclerosis, and other
conditions associated with saturated fats and
cholesterol, which are more prevalent in meat than
vegetables. The United States Department of
Agriculture spends a lot of money on inspecting meat
for health hazards, and a lot of questions have recently
been raised about the adequacy of those inspections.
Vegetarians do not have to fear all those hazards meat
inspectors are supposed to be guarding against, nor
do they have to fear that these inspectors are not doing
their job. Thus, an unbiased review of the risks
actually run by vegetarians vs. those actually run by
meat-eaters-rather than a one-sided listing of risks
supposedly, possibly run by vegetarians-might well
leave the vegetarians far ahead on Weir's risk criterion
for choosing or imposing a diet.
Turning to Weir's charges of ambiguity concerning
an "adequate" diet, he legitimately points out that
nutritional needs vary, so that what is adequate for one
group of people may not be so for another. However,
other than his totally unsubstantiated claim that
children need animal protein, his "facts" do not
indicate that there are people who cannot, based on
their physiological needs, obtain adequate nutrients from
vegetable products. Consequently, whatever ambiguity
may be involved here is irrelevant to the substantive
issue of an obligation not to exploit animals for food.
In addition to that ambiguity, Weir seems to be
bothered by the idea of relying on dietary "supplements,"
i. e., pills and liquids consumed just to insure adequate
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nutnlJon. The phrase "dietary supplement" suggests
that a diet should be defined without reference to these
products. However, advocates of vegetarianism, such
as John Robbins, do not hesitate to recommend that
these products be included as a part of one's diet to
insure that we get all the nutrients we need. So there is
an ambiguity here. Also, the need to "supplement" a
diet may suggest that the diet itself is inadequate.
Morally, these issues are trivial. People who do
not eat meat or who avoid eating animal products
altogether can obtain all needed nutrients without
supplements, and this is true whether they are young
or old, male or female, pregnant or not, and so forth.
The supplementary pills or liquids simply make it
easier and more certain that this is accomplished.
These supplements would raise a significant,
compromising issue for a vegetarian diet if they always
involved animal products, but Weir does not suggest
this-and for good reason, for there are non-animal
produced supplements.
Since they are trivial matters, we can easily answer
Weir's concerns about ambiguity regarding "vegetarianism" and "adequacy" by saying that the questioo is:
Can a diet that contains no meat or even animal products
at all provide all the nutrients needed for robust human
health, and is this the case for women as well as men,
the young as well as the old, those who are pregnant as
well as those who are not, and so forth? Thus defining
a vegetarian diet by what it excludes leaves open the
possibility that it includes "supplements." And if
including "supplements" in the diet offends anyone's
conceptual sensitivities, just call them "dietary
enhancers" rather than supplements. The substantive
point is that the answer to that question is "Yes" in both
the meat-free and vegan cases and for young and old,
male and female, etc. The evidence for that answer is
the tens of millions of young and old, male and female,
etc., healthy vegetarians and the many scientific studies
of them that conflI1l1 their health.
A final word on Weir's comments concerning
nutrition: he may well have a hidden agenda here. Weir
frequently raises environmental concerns, uses the word
"natural" repeatedly (as in his "fact" aboutB-12),asserts
several times that we are omnivores "by nature," seems
offended by the idea of being dependent on technology
(e. g., vitamin pills) for nutrients, and sees "plastic
meals" at the bottom of the slippery slope of
vegetarianism. So, perhaps his opposition to vegetarianism really lies in his feeling that is is unnatural and
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a threat to the rural way of life he prefers. Weir
acknowledges that he has lived on a family farm and
waxes idyllic about the possibilities of such farming.
Of course, that Weir likes to think of himself as a
steak chewer rather than a vitamin swallower does not
count for much when the question is whether we have
a moral obligation to stop exploiting animals for food.
Furthennore, Weir may well be mistaken about what
humans are "by nature." According to the president of
the Medical Students Association at Stanford
University, who is a vegetarian, our dentition, facial
structure, and digestive tracts do not closely resemble
those of natural omnivores, such as bears. Rather, our
physiology suggests that we are herbivores by nature.
Perhaps meat and other animal products were the easy,
secure dietary supplements of our herbivorous
ancestors, supplements on which they came to place
ever greater reliance as they developed the unnatural
technologies of domestication and ranching.
If Weir wants to tackle a substantive issue of
ambiguity in moral philosophy, he should question,
rather than uncritically use, the term "natural." For
example, even it if is "natural" for us (humans) to
exercise our vastly superior power to exploit and kill
animals for a compact source of nutrients, does that
make it right? I should think not, for the fact that it is
"natural" for males of our species to exploit females
does not make that right. However, Weir's uncritical,
repeated reliance on the term "natural" suggests that
what (he thinks) is "natural" for humans is right.
Again, to say that we are something "by nature"
suggests that is is not a matter of choice. Btit it is people
who choose to be vegetarians. So, even if we were
omnivores "by nature," that could not entail that we
cannot choose to be otherwise. Furthermore, one of
the things Weir cites as making humans especially
worthy is our autonomy. It would seem that his idea of
human "nature" is a very convenient one: it excuses
our exploiting animals as inevitable but does not
interfere with our congratulating ourselves on being
superior to animals because we are autonomous.
Again, Weir, like many environmentalists, seems to
view doing what's "natural" as returning to a simpler,
non-technological, rural way of life. But if biology has
taught us anything for the past century and a half, it is
that change is what nature is all about. What we, like
all creatures, are "by nature" is in a process of evolution.
Consequently, appeals to what we are "by nature"
cannot entail that we must or even ought to remain as
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we are or return to what we were. As Sartre would say,
such inferences are exercises in bad faith.
Finally, some of the environmental concerns raised
by Weir are bogus. For example, in the United States
and United Kingdom we already produce more eggs,
dairy products, and plant protein than we can consume
or sell abroad for food. Also, most of the plant protein
we raise is currently fed to cattle. So, it is far from
obvious that turning to these resources to replace
nutrients presently obtained from meat would threaten
environmental havoc. Weir's legitimate environmental
concerns indicate only that implementing world-wide
vegetarianism would have to incorporate environmental
protection caveats and socio-economic reforms. That
this is so does not show that we are not obligated to
become vegetarians; it shows only that fulfilling that
obligation may be more complicated than some people
may have thought.
Thus, it is Weir's "reasons" for doubting the adequacy
of a vegetarian diet that are anemic and in need of supplementsbefore they can povidea:leqWlle fare for an impartial
mind. However, in this case the evidence indicates that
supplements do not exist. The evidence indicates that
the claim that "a vegetarian diet is adequate for human
nutrition" is neither false nor substantively ambiguous.

First, Weir totally undermines his argument for the
utility of exploiting animals by admitting that if people
would maintain animals in good condition and not
slaughter them for food, such a world would be hedonistically superior to animal-exploiting worlds. He goes
on to say, however, that we should not consider such a
world, because humans are not unselfish enough to
mainIain it. TIisresram ill mjtldied W'ml running moral
tIxlught experiments, we are entitled to consider altruistic
options. Especially where utilitarian hedonistic
calculations provide the test, we are entitled to envisage
worlds in which humans act on the basis of utilitarian,
hedonistic calculations. Such worlds can at least define
guiding ideal obligations for our real world of less than
perfect, utilitarian altruism. It follows that Weir's
analysis ofpossible worlds fails to show that hedonistic,
utilitarian calculations require exploiting animals.
Second, Weir insists on being tough-minded about
the suffering that would be imposed on animals by
massive dependence on eggs and dairy products for
nutrients. But his talk of animals being "raised
humanely and killed mercifully" for massive
dependence on meat for nutrients goes beyond a
romanticized view of traditional farming to a see-noevil refusal to acknowledge the massive animal
suffering involved in the production of massive amounts
of meat to feed billions of humans. Weir's idyllic vision
extends even to "tax breaks and legislation [which will]
help insure that lands near cities will be reserved for
small farms." I hesitate to startle a sweet dreamer, but
the lands near cities have already been developed into
suburbs. And in northern California, I am sure,
agribusiness interests in the Sacramento and San
Joaquin Valleys are no more ready to turn over their
land to family farmers than millions and millions of
urban- and suburbanites are ready to spend additional
hours and hours on the roads forsaking supermarkets
to shop at family farms.
Weir also tough-mindedly emphasizes the
environmental dangers of increased egg and dairy
protection. Somehow, he overlooks well-known
environmental benefits of eliminating meat production.
For example, billions of acres of rain forests and other
native lands have been and are continuing to be
destroyed to make way for pastures to graze cattle and
fields to raise grain to feed to cattle. World-wide
vegetarianism would put an end to this pattern of
destruction and could even lead to the return of many
native eco-systems, since we will need less vegetable

The Empirical Argument from Pain
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Weir contends that "a pleasure-pain calculus taken
by itself would require that we eat meat" However,
the basic thrust of his discussion seems to be to discredit
hedonistic utilitarianism altogether. For example, he
argues that a hedonistic calculus may entail "a duty to
bring about the extinction of the human species" and
contends that even "the mere plausibility" of this
conclusion "is a reductio ad absurdum for the hedonistic
utilitarian argument."
The points Weir makes in this part of his paper have
been made many times before, from Leslie Stephens'
"If all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at
all" to R. G. Frey's elaborate catalog of the Armageddon
consequences of vegetarianism in Rights, Killing and
Suffering (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). They have also
been refuted many times before; for example, I have
discussed questions about the utility of exploiting
animals at length in Chapters 6, 10, and 11 of Morals,
Reason, and Animals (philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987). Consequently, I will restrict my comments
here to the following.
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protein if we eat it ourselves, rather than feeding it to
animals and then eating them. Thus, Weir's discussion
of the environmental effects of vegetarianism continues
the one-sided pattern of argument begun with his
discussion of dietary risks.
Third, Weir suggests that the only remedy for the
inadequacy of hedonistic utilitarianism as a moral
philosophy is to postulate a non-hedonistic, "intrinsic"
value possessed by humans and human-like animals.
However, this is not the only way of coping with that
inadequacy (if it exists). For example, the following
maxim from William James points to another way:
"Take any demand, however slight, which any creature,
however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own
sake, to be satisfied? If not, prove why not"
Weir begins, as so many moral philosophers have
and still do, with the hierarchical presumption that one
has to have some special value in order to be worthy of
not being exploited. James, like other modern moral
philosophers who insist on the fundamental importance
of principles of equality, challenges that aristocratic
presumption. In effect, James is contending that from
the moral point of view one does not have to be of
special value to be worthy of having one's interests
satisfied. The advance ofegalitarianism and the retreat
of feudalism during the modern era favor James'
egalitaWl emphasis over Weir's aristocratic presumption.
"Is he worthy of fair treatment?" seems to many modem
ears a very strange question, indeed.
Thus, Weir's one-sided thought experiments fail to
discredit the proposition that "a meat diet causes
unnecessary pain," and his suggestion that only an
anthropocentric, aristocratic postulation of value can
overcome the (supposed) inadequacies of hedonistic
utilitarianism is mistaken; rejecting aristocratic
presumptions in favor of egalitarianism can also
overcome those (supposed) inadequacies.

conflicts; no autonomous person can reasonably be
coerced to put their health at risk. ..As a matter of fact,
the pain inflicted is not wrnecessary."
Although Weir believes that he has a third, moral
objection to the vegetarian argument here, this objection
basically just repeats his empirical contention that
vegetarianism is risky. We have already discredited that
contention.
Weir's one moral claim here is that people cannot
reasonably be coerced into putting their health at risk.
That "coerced" is purple prose, of course; the issue is
whether people can reasonably be obligated to put their
health at risk. There is a considerable consensus that
they can be. Fa" example, Socrates believed he was under
an obligation to serve in the army, thereby putting his
health at risk. He even believed himself to be obligated
to remain faithful to his philosophical convictions, even
though this put his health more than at risk. Many other
patriots have shared at least Socrates' belief that citizens
can reasonably be obligated (even forced) to put their
health at risk in the defense of their community. "Death
bef<re dishonor" is another, not uncommon, m<Yal slogan
covering a variety of situations in which obligations
are recognized which will put people's health at risk..
So, it is not obvious that we cannot have an
obligation which might put our health at risk.
Consequently, even if a vegetarian diet were riskier than
a meat-eating diet, it would not follow that we are not
obligated by the principle of unnecessary pain to be
vegetarians. Contrary to what Weir apparently believes,
there is no guarantee that a moral life will be a safe and
easy one; convictions can require courage.
Conclusion
Since Weir's critique of the unnecessary pain
argument for vegetarianism focuses on questions of
nutrition, the basic response to his defense of meateating is that his fears about the risks being run by
vegetarians are unfounded. Consequently, we are not
tragically condemned by nutritional dependency on
meat to continue exploiting animals for food. If Weir
does sincerely "wish things were otherwise" than he
has made them out to be, then he can be of good cheer:
they are otherwise, and paying a little, nutritionallyinformed attention to his diet or even just swallowing a
vitamin pill now and then can easily and reliably keep
him safe from the bogies which, apparently, have
heretofore frightened him away from an ethical diet.

The Moral Argument from Unnecessary Pain
According to Weir, the Principle of Unnecessary

Pain states that "pain can be inflicted only in cases of
genuine conflict and only in order to prevent an
unavoidable worse evil." (How one prevents the
unavoidable, I do not know. Perhaps Weir intended to
say "otherwise unavoidable.") Weir does not object to
this principle but contends that it does not prohibit
killing animals for food, because "nutrition and health
are surely significant and legitimate overriding moral
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